Blob Blame History Raw
--- lynx2-8-6/CHANGES.old	2008-11-06 15:29:26.000000000 +0100
+++ lynx2-8-6/CHANGES	2008-11-06 15:32:44.000000000 +0100
@@ -1,5 +1,11 @@
 Changes since Lynx 2.8 release
 ===============================================================================
+2008-10-26 
+* modify patch for CVE-2005-2929 to prompt user before executing command via 
+  a lynxcgi link even in advanced mode, as the actual URL may not be shown but 
+  hidden behind an HTTP redirect 
+* set TRUSTED_LYNXCGI:none in lynx.cfg to disable all lynxcgi URLs by default 
+  [CVE-2008-4690] 
 
 2007-05-09 (2.8.6rel.5 fix from 2.8.7dev.5)
 * correct loop-limit in print_crawl_to_fd(), which broke
--- lynx2-8-6/src/LYCgi.c.old	2008-11-06 15:29:58.000000000 +0100
+++ lynx2-8-6/src/LYCgi.c	2008-11-06 15:30:53.000000000 +0100
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ static BOOL can_exec_cgi(const char *lin
     if (!exec_ok(HTLoadedDocumentURL(), linktext, CGI_PATH)) {
 	/* exec_ok gives out msg. */
 	result = FALSE;
-    } else if (user_mode < ADVANCED_MODE) {
+    } else {
 	StrAllocCopy(command, linktext);
 	if (non_empty(linkargs)) {
 	    HTSprintf(&command, " %s", linkargs);
--- lynx2-8-5.orig/lynx.cfg	2008-10-26 21:45:02.000000000 +0100
+++ lynx2-8-5/lynx.cfg	2008-10-26 21:45:38.000000000 +0100
@@ -997,7 +997,7 @@ CHARACTER_SET:utf-8
 # ====
 # Do not define this.
 #
-#TRUSTED_LYNXCGI:none
+TRUSTED_LYNXCGI:none
 
 
 .h2 LYNXCGI_ENVIRONMENT