diff --git a/0001-bgpd-security-Fix-double-free-of-unknown-attribute.patch b/0001-bgpd-security-Fix-double-free-of-unknown-attribute.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1da4bea --- /dev/null +++ b/0001-bgpd-security-Fix-double-free-of-unknown-attribute.patch @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +From e69b535f92eafb599329bf725d9b4c6fd5d7fded Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Paul Jakma +Date: Sat, 6 Jan 2018 19:52:10 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] bgpd/security: Fix double free of unknown attribute + +Security issue: Quagga-2018-1114 +See: https://www.quagga.net/security/Quagga-2018-1114.txt + +It is possible for bgpd to double-free an unknown attribute. This can happen +via bgp_update_receive receiving an UPDATE with an invalid unknown attribute. +bgp_update_receive then will call bgp_attr_unintern_sub and bgp_attr_flush, +and the latter may try free an already freed unknown attr. + +* bgpd/bgp_attr.c: (transit_unintern) Take a pointer to the caller's storage + for the (struct transit *), so that transit_unintern can NULL out the + caller's reference if the (struct transit) is freed. + (cluster_unintern) By inspection, appears to have a similar issue. + (bgp_attr_unintern_sub) adjust for above. +--- + bgpd/bgp_attr.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++-------------- + bgpd/bgp_attr.h | 4 ++-- + 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/bgpd/bgp_attr.c b/bgpd/bgp_attr.c +index 9564637e..0c2806b5 100644 +--- a/bgpd/bgp_attr.c ++++ b/bgpd/bgp_attr.c +@@ -199,15 +199,17 @@ cluster_intern (struct cluster_list *cluster) + } + + void +-cluster_unintern (struct cluster_list *cluster) ++cluster_unintern (struct cluster_list **cluster) + { +- if (cluster->refcnt) +- cluster->refcnt--; ++ struct cluster_list *c = *cluster; ++ if (c->refcnt) ++ c->refcnt--; + +- if (cluster->refcnt == 0) ++ if (c->refcnt == 0) + { +- hash_release (cluster_hash, cluster); +- cluster_free (cluster); ++ hash_release (cluster_hash, c); ++ cluster_free (c); ++ *cluster = NULL; + } + } + +@@ -357,15 +359,18 @@ transit_intern (struct transit *transit) + } + + void +-transit_unintern (struct transit *transit) ++transit_unintern (struct transit **transit) + { +- if (transit->refcnt) +- transit->refcnt--; ++ struct transit *t = *transit; ++ ++ if (t->refcnt) ++ t->refcnt--; + +- if (transit->refcnt == 0) ++ if (t->refcnt == 0) + { +- hash_release (transit_hash, transit); +- transit_free (transit); ++ hash_release (transit_hash, t); ++ transit_free (t); ++ *transit = NULL; + } + } + +@@ -820,11 +825,11 @@ bgp_attr_unintern_sub (struct attr *attr) + UNSET_FLAG(attr->flag, ATTR_FLAG_BIT (BGP_ATTR_LARGE_COMMUNITIES)); + + if (attr->extra->cluster) +- cluster_unintern (attr->extra->cluster); ++ cluster_unintern (&attr->extra->cluster); + UNSET_FLAG(attr->flag, ATTR_FLAG_BIT (BGP_ATTR_CLUSTER_LIST)); + + if (attr->extra->transit) +- transit_unintern (attr->extra->transit); ++ transit_unintern (&attr->extra->transit); + } + } + +diff --git a/bgpd/bgp_attr.h b/bgpd/bgp_attr.h +index 9ff074b2..052acc7d 100644 +--- a/bgpd/bgp_attr.h ++++ b/bgpd/bgp_attr.h +@@ -187,10 +187,10 @@ extern unsigned long int attr_unknown_count (void); + + /* Cluster list prototypes. */ + extern int cluster_loop_check (struct cluster_list *, struct in_addr); +-extern void cluster_unintern (struct cluster_list *); ++extern void cluster_unintern (struct cluster_list **); + + /* Transit attribute prototypes. */ +-void transit_unintern (struct transit *); ++void transit_unintern (struct transit **); + + /* Below exported for unit-test purposes only */ + struct bgp_attr_parser_args { +-- +2.14.3 + diff --git a/0001-bgpd-security-debug-print-of-received-NOTIFY-data-ca.patch b/0001-bgpd-security-debug-print-of-received-NOTIFY-data-ca.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c1dbf5f --- /dev/null +++ b/0001-bgpd-security-debug-print-of-received-NOTIFY-data-ca.patch @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +From 9e5251151894aefdf8e9392a2371615222119ad8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Paul Jakma +Date: Sat, 6 Jan 2018 22:31:52 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] bgpd/security: debug print of received NOTIFY data can + over-read msg array + +Security issue: Quagga-2018-1550 +See: https://www.quagga.net/security/Quagga-2018-1550.txt + +* bgpd/bgp_debug.c: (struct message) Nearly every one of the NOTIFY + code/subcode message arrays has their corresponding size variables off + by one, as most have 1 as first index. + + This means (bgp_notify_print) can cause mes_lookup to overread the (struct + message) by 1 pointer value if given an unknown index. + + Fix the bgp_notify_..._msg_max variables to use the compiler to calculate + the correct sizes. +--- + bgpd/bgp_debug.c | 21 ++++++++++++--------- + 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/bgpd/bgp_debug.c b/bgpd/bgp_debug.c +index ba797228..43faee7c 100644 +--- a/bgpd/bgp_debug.c ++++ b/bgpd/bgp_debug.c +@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ Software Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA + #include "log.h" + #include "sockunion.h" + #include "filter.h" ++#include "memory.h" + + #include "bgpd/bgpd.h" + #include "bgpd/bgp_aspath.h" +@@ -73,7 +74,8 @@ const struct message bgp_status_msg[] = + { Clearing, "Clearing" }, + { Deleted, "Deleted" }, + }; +-const int bgp_status_msg_max = BGP_STATUS_MAX; ++#define BGP_DEBUG_MSG_MAX(msg) const int msg ## _max = array_size (msg) ++BGP_DEBUG_MSG_MAX (bgp_status_msg); + + /* BGP message type string. */ + const char *bgp_type_str[] = +@@ -84,7 +86,8 @@ const char *bgp_type_str[] = + "NOTIFICATION", + "KEEPALIVE", + "ROUTE-REFRESH", +- "CAPABILITY" ++ "CAPABILITY", ++ NULL, + }; + + /* message for BGP-4 Notify */ +@@ -98,15 +101,15 @@ static const struct message bgp_notify_msg[] = + { BGP_NOTIFY_CEASE, "Cease"}, + { BGP_NOTIFY_CAPABILITY_ERR, "CAPABILITY Message Error"}, + }; +-static const int bgp_notify_msg_max = BGP_NOTIFY_MAX; ++BGP_DEBUG_MSG_MAX (bgp_notify_msg); + + static const struct message bgp_notify_head_msg[] = + { + { BGP_NOTIFY_HEADER_NOT_SYNC, "/Connection Not Synchronized"}, + { BGP_NOTIFY_HEADER_BAD_MESLEN, "/Bad Message Length"}, +- { BGP_NOTIFY_HEADER_BAD_MESTYPE, "/Bad Message Type"} ++ { BGP_NOTIFY_HEADER_BAD_MESTYPE, "/Bad Message Type"}, + }; +-static const int bgp_notify_head_msg_max = BGP_NOTIFY_HEADER_MAX; ++BGP_DEBUG_MSG_MAX (bgp_notify_head_msg); + + static const struct message bgp_notify_open_msg[] = + { +@@ -119,7 +122,7 @@ static const struct message bgp_notify_open_msg[] = + { BGP_NOTIFY_OPEN_UNACEP_HOLDTIME, "/Unacceptable Hold Time"}, + { BGP_NOTIFY_OPEN_UNSUP_CAPBL, "/Unsupported Capability"}, + }; +-static const int bgp_notify_open_msg_max = BGP_NOTIFY_OPEN_MAX; ++BGP_DEBUG_MSG_MAX (bgp_notify_open_msg); + + static const struct message bgp_notify_update_msg[] = + { +@@ -136,7 +139,7 @@ static const struct message bgp_notify_update_msg[] = + { BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_INVAL_NETWORK, "/Invalid Network Field"}, + { BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_MAL_AS_PATH, "/Malformed AS_PATH"}, + }; +-static const int bgp_notify_update_msg_max = BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_MAX; ++BGP_DEBUG_MSG_MAX (bgp_notify_update_msg); + + static const struct message bgp_notify_cease_msg[] = + { +@@ -150,7 +153,7 @@ static const struct message bgp_notify_cease_msg[] = + { BGP_NOTIFY_CEASE_COLLISION_RESOLUTION, "/Connection collision resolution"}, + { BGP_NOTIFY_CEASE_OUT_OF_RESOURCE, "/Out of Resource"}, + }; +-static const int bgp_notify_cease_msg_max = BGP_NOTIFY_CEASE_MAX; ++BGP_DEBUG_MSG_MAX (bgp_notify_cease_msg); + + static const struct message bgp_notify_capability_msg[] = + { +@@ -159,7 +162,7 @@ static const struct message bgp_notify_capability_msg[] = + { BGP_NOTIFY_CAPABILITY_INVALID_LENGTH, "/Invalid Capability Length"}, + { BGP_NOTIFY_CAPABILITY_MALFORMED_CODE, "/Malformed Capability Value"}, + }; +-static const int bgp_notify_capability_msg_max = BGP_NOTIFY_CAPABILITY_MAX; ++BGP_DEBUG_MSG_MAX (bgp_notify_capability_msg); + + /* Origin strings. */ + const char *bgp_origin_str[] = {"i","e","?"}; +-- +2.14.3 + diff --git a/0001-bgpd-security-fix-infinite-loop-on-certain-invalid-O.patch b/0001-bgpd-security-fix-infinite-loop-on-certain-invalid-O.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a9b0e77 --- /dev/null +++ b/0001-bgpd-security-fix-infinite-loop-on-certain-invalid-O.patch @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +From ce07207c50a3d1f05d6dd49b5294282e59749787 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Paul Jakma +Date: Sat, 6 Jan 2018 21:20:51 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] bgpd/security: fix infinite loop on certain invalid OPEN + messages + +Security issue: Quagga-2018-1975 +See: https://www.quagga.net/security/Quagga-2018-1975.txt + +* bgpd/bgp_packet.c: (bgp_capability_msg_parse) capability parser can infinite + loop due to checks that issue 'continue' without bumping the input + pointer. +--- + bgpd/bgp_packet.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/bgpd/bgp_packet.c b/bgpd/bgp_packet.c +index b3d601fc..f9338d8d 100644 +--- a/bgpd/bgp_packet.c ++++ b/bgpd/bgp_packet.c +@@ -2328,7 +2328,8 @@ bgp_capability_msg_parse (struct peer *peer, u_char *pnt, bgp_size_t length) + + end = pnt + length; + +- while (pnt < end) ++ /* XXX: Streamify this */ ++ for (; pnt < end; pnt += hdr->length + 3) + { + /* We need at least action, capability code and capability length. */ + if (pnt + 3 > end) +@@ -2416,7 +2417,6 @@ bgp_capability_msg_parse (struct peer *peer, u_char *pnt, bgp_size_t length) + zlog_warn ("%s unrecognized capability code: %d - ignored", + peer->host, hdr->code); + } +- pnt += hdr->length + 3; + } + return 0; + } +-- +2.14.3 + diff --git a/0001-bgpd-security-invalid-attr-length-sends-NOTIFY-with-.patch b/0001-bgpd-security-invalid-attr-length-sends-NOTIFY-with-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..296b7f8 --- /dev/null +++ b/0001-bgpd-security-invalid-attr-length-sends-NOTIFY-with-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +From cc2e6770697e343f4af534114ab7e633d5beabec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Paul Jakma +Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 23:57:33 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] bgpd/security: invalid attr length sends NOTIFY with data + overrun + +Security issue: Quagga-2018-0543 + +See: https://www.quagga.net/security/Quagga-2018-0543.txt + +* bgpd/bgp_attr.c: (bgp_attr_parse) An invalid attribute length is correctly + checked, and a NOTIFY prepared. The NOTIFY can include the incorrect + received data with the NOTIFY, for debug purposes. Commit + c69698704806a9ac5 modified the code to do that just, and also send the + malformed attr with the NOTIFY. However, the invalid attribute length was + used as the length of the data to send back. + + The result is a read past the end of data, which is then written to the + NOTIFY message and sent to the peer. + + A configured BGP peer can use this bug to read up to 64 KiB of memory from + the bgpd process, or crash the process if the invalid read is caught by + some means (unmapped page and SEGV, or other mechanism) resulting in a DoS. + + This bug _ought_ /not/ be exploitable by anything other than the connected + BGP peer, assuming the underlying TCP transport is secure. For no BGP + peer should send on an UPDATE with this attribute. Quagga will not, as + Quagga always validates the attr header length, regardless of type. + + However, it is possible that there are BGP implementations that do not + check lengths on some attributes (e.g. optional/transitive ones of a type + they do not recognise), and might pass such malformed attrs on. If such + implementations exists and are common, then this bug might be triggerable + by BGP speakers further hops away. Those peers will not receive the + NOTIFY (unless they sit on a shared medium), however they might then be + able to trigger a DoS. + + Fix: use the valid bound to calculate the length. +--- + bgpd/bgp_attr.c | 4 +++- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/bgpd/bgp_attr.c b/bgpd/bgp_attr.c +index ef58beb1..9564637e 100644 +--- a/bgpd/bgp_attr.c ++++ b/bgpd/bgp_attr.c +@@ -2147,6 +2147,8 @@ bgp_attr_parse (struct peer *peer, struct attr *attr, bgp_size_t size, + memset (seen, 0, BGP_ATTR_BITMAP_SIZE); + + /* End pointer of BGP attribute. */ ++ assert (size <= stream_get_size (BGP_INPUT (peer))); ++ assert (size <= stream_get_endp (BGP_INPUT (peer))); + endp = BGP_INPUT_PNT (peer) + size; + + /* Get attributes to the end of attribute length. */ +@@ -2228,7 +2230,7 @@ bgp_attr_parse (struct peer *peer, struct attr *attr, bgp_size_t size, + bgp_notify_send_with_data (peer, + BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ERR, + BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ATTR_LENG_ERR, +- startp, attr_endp - startp); ++ startp, endp - startp); + return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_ERROR; + } + +-- +2.14.3 + diff --git a/quagga.spec b/quagga.spec index 944e23e..799b8a9 100644 --- a/quagga.spec +++ b/quagga.spec @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ Name: quagga Version: 1.2.2 -Release: 3%{?dist} +Release: 4%{?dist} Summary: Routing daemon License: GPLv2+ Group: System Environment/Daemons @@ -29,6 +29,15 @@ Requires(postun): systemd Provides: routingdaemon = %{version}-%{release} Obsoletes: quagga-sysvinit +# Upstream patch: +Patch0: 0001-bgpd-security-Fix-double-free-of-unknown-attribute.patch +# Upstream patch: +Patch1: 0001-bgpd-security-debug-print-of-received-NOTIFY-data-ca.patch +# Upstream patch: +Patch2: 0001-bgpd-security-fix-infinite-loop-on-certain-invalid-O.patch +# Upstream patch: +Patch3: 0001-bgpd-security-invalid-attr-length-sends-NOTIFY-with-.patch + %define __perl_requires %{SOURCE1} %description @@ -225,6 +234,21 @@ fi %{_includedir}/quagga/ospfd/*.h %changelog +* Thu Feb 22 2018 Ondřej Lysoněk - 1.2.2-4 +- Fixed CVE-2018-5379 - Double free vulnerability in bgpd when processing + certain forms of UPDATE message allowing to crash or potentially execute + arbitrary code +- Resolves: rhbz#1546008 +- Fixed CVE-2018-5380 - bgpd can overrun internal BGP code-to-string + conversion tables potentially allowing crash +- Resolves: rhbz#1546006 +- Fixed CVE-2018-5381 - Infinite loop issue triggered by invalid OPEN message + allows denial-of-service +- Resolves: rhbz#1546004 +- Fixed CVE-2018-5378 - bgpd does not properly bounds check the data sent with + a NOTIFY allowing leak of sensitive data or crash +- Resolves: rhbz#1546009 + * Fri Feb 09 2018 Igor Gnatenko - 1.2.2-3 - Escape macros in %%changelog