From b3ceae982ac37ef9c23ab794ab0b300da6d9d5ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Joe Orton <jorton@redhat.com>
Date: Nov 21 2019 16:56:37 +0000
Subject: mod_ssl: fix request body buffering w/TLSv1.3 PHA (#1775146)


---

diff --git a/httpd-2.4.41-r1870095+.patch b/httpd-2.4.41-r1870095+.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f29e6f2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/httpd-2.4.41-r1870095+.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+# ./pullrev.sh 1870095 1870097
+http://svn.apache.org/viewvc?view=revision&revision=1870095
+http://svn.apache.org/viewvc?view=revision&revision=1870097
+
+--- httpd-2.4.41/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c
++++ httpd-2.4.41/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c
+@@ -114,6 +114,45 @@
+     return result;
+ }
+ 
++/* If a renegotiation is required for the location, and the request
++ * includes a message body (and the client has not requested a "100
++ * Continue" response), then the client will be streaming the request
++ * body over the wire already.  In that case, it is not possible to
++ * stop and perform a new SSL handshake immediately; once the SSL
++ * library moves to the "accept" state, it will reject the SSL packets
++ * which the client is sending for the request body.
++ *
++ * To allow authentication to complete in the hook, the solution used
++ * here is to fill a (bounded) buffer with the request body, and then
++ * to reinject that request body later.
++ *
++ * This function is called to fill the renegotiation buffer for the
++ * location as required, or fail.  Returns zero on success or HTTP_
++ * error code on failure.
++ */
++static int fill_reneg_buffer(request_rec *r, SSLDirConfigRec *dc)
++{
++    int rv;
++    apr_size_t rsize;
++
++    /* ### this is HTTP/1.1 specific, special case for protocol? */
++    if (r->expecting_100 || !ap_request_has_body(r)) {
++        return 0;
++    }
++
++    rsize = dc->nRenegBufferSize == UNSET ? DEFAULT_RENEG_BUFFER_SIZE : dc->nRenegBufferSize;
++    if (rsize > 0) {
++        /* Fill the I/O buffer with the request body if possible. */
++        rv = ssl_io_buffer_fill(r, rsize);
++    }
++    else {
++        /* If the reneg buffer size is set to zero, just fail. */
++        rv = HTTP_REQUEST_ENTITY_TOO_LARGE;
++    }
++
++    return rv;
++}
++
+ #ifdef HAVE_TLSEXT
+ static int ap_array_same_str_set(apr_array_header_t *s1, apr_array_header_t *s2)
+ {
+@@ -814,41 +853,14 @@
+         }
+     }
+ 
+-    /* If a renegotiation is now required for this location, and the
+-     * request includes a message body (and the client has not
+-     * requested a "100 Continue" response), then the client will be
+-     * streaming the request body over the wire already.  In that
+-     * case, it is not possible to stop and perform a new SSL
+-     * handshake immediately; once the SSL library moves to the
+-     * "accept" state, it will reject the SSL packets which the client
+-     * is sending for the request body.
+-     *
+-     * To allow authentication to complete in this auth hook, the
+-     * solution used here is to fill a (bounded) buffer with the
+-     * request body, and then to reinject that request body later.
+-     */
+-    if (renegotiate && !renegotiate_quick
+-        && !r->expecting_100
+-        && ap_request_has_body(r)) {
+-        int rv;
+-        apr_size_t rsize;
+-
+-        rsize = dc->nRenegBufferSize == UNSET ? DEFAULT_RENEG_BUFFER_SIZE :
+-                                                dc->nRenegBufferSize;
+-        if (rsize > 0) {
+-            /* Fill the I/O buffer with the request body if possible. */
+-            rv = ssl_io_buffer_fill(r, rsize);
+-        }
+-        else {
+-            /* If the reneg buffer size is set to zero, just fail. */
+-            rv = HTTP_REQUEST_ENTITY_TOO_LARGE;
+-        }
+-
+-        if (rv) {
++    /* Fill reneg buffer if required. */
++    if (renegotiate && !renegotiate_quick) {
++        rc = fill_reneg_buffer(r, dc);
++        if (rc) {
+             ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02257)
+                           "could not buffer message body to allow "
+                           "SSL renegotiation to proceed");
+-            return rv;
++            return rc;
+         }
+     }
+ 
+@@ -1132,6 +1144,17 @@
+             }
+         }
+ 
++        /* Fill reneg buffer if required. */
++        if (change_vmode) {
++            rc = fill_reneg_buffer(r, dc);
++            if (rc) {
++                ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(10228)
++                              "could not buffer message body to allow "
++                              "TLS Post-Handshake Authentication to proceed");
++                return rc;
++            }
++        }
++
+         if (change_vmode) {
+             char peekbuf[1];
+ 
diff --git a/httpd-2.4.41-r1870095.patch b/httpd-2.4.41-r1870095.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 5f5b2e2..0000000
--- a/httpd-2.4.41-r1870095.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,119 +0,0 @@
-# ./pullrev.sh 1870095
-http://svn.apache.org/viewvc?view=revision&revision=1870095
-
-https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1775146
-
---- httpd-2.4.41/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c
-+++ httpd-2.4.41/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c
-@@ -114,6 +114,45 @@
-     return result;
- }
- 
-+/* If a renegotiation is required for the location, and the request
-+ * includes a message body (and the client has not requested a "100
-+ * Continue" response), then the client will be streaming the request
-+ * body over the wire already.  In that case, it is not possible to
-+ * stop and perform a new SSL handshake immediately; once the SSL
-+ * library moves to the "accept" state, it will reject the SSL packets
-+ * which the client is sending for the request body.
-+ *
-+ * To allow authentication to complete in the hook, the solution used
-+ * here is to fill a (bounded) buffer with the request body, and then
-+ * to reinject that request body later.
-+ *
-+ * This function is called to fill the renegotiation buffer for the
-+ * location as required, or fail.  Returns zero on success or HTTP_
-+ * error code on failure.
-+ */
-+static int fill_reneg_buffer(request_rec *r, SSLDirConfigRec *dc)
-+{
-+    int rv;
-+    apr_size_t rsize;
-+
-+    /* ### this is HTTP/1.1 specific, special case for protocol? */
-+    if (r->expecting_100 || !ap_request_has_body(r)) {
-+        return 0;
-+    }
-+
-+    rsize = dc->nRenegBufferSize == UNSET ? DEFAULT_RENEG_BUFFER_SIZE : dc->nRenegBufferSize;
-+    if (rsize > 0) {
-+        /* Fill the I/O buffer with the request body if possible. */
-+        rv = ssl_io_buffer_fill(r, rsize);
-+    }
-+    else {
-+        /* If the reneg buffer size is set to zero, just fail. */
-+        rv = HTTP_REQUEST_ENTITY_TOO_LARGE;
-+    }
-+
-+    return rv;
-+}
-+
- #ifdef HAVE_TLSEXT
- static int ap_array_same_str_set(apr_array_header_t *s1, apr_array_header_t *s2)
- {
-@@ -814,41 +853,14 @@
-         }
-     }
- 
--    /* If a renegotiation is now required for this location, and the
--     * request includes a message body (and the client has not
--     * requested a "100 Continue" response), then the client will be
--     * streaming the request body over the wire already.  In that
--     * case, it is not possible to stop and perform a new SSL
--     * handshake immediately; once the SSL library moves to the
--     * "accept" state, it will reject the SSL packets which the client
--     * is sending for the request body.
--     *
--     * To allow authentication to complete in this auth hook, the
--     * solution used here is to fill a (bounded) buffer with the
--     * request body, and then to reinject that request body later.
--     */
--    if (renegotiate && !renegotiate_quick
--        && !r->expecting_100
--        && ap_request_has_body(r)) {
--        int rv;
--        apr_size_t rsize;
--
--        rsize = dc->nRenegBufferSize == UNSET ? DEFAULT_RENEG_BUFFER_SIZE :
--                                                dc->nRenegBufferSize;
--        if (rsize > 0) {
--            /* Fill the I/O buffer with the request body if possible. */
--            rv = ssl_io_buffer_fill(r, rsize);
--        }
--        else {
--            /* If the reneg buffer size is set to zero, just fail. */
--            rv = HTTP_REQUEST_ENTITY_TOO_LARGE;
--        }
--
--        if (rv) {
-+    /* Fill reneg buffer if required. */
-+    if (renegotiate && !renegotiate_quick) {
-+        rc = fill_reneg_buffer(r, dc);
-+        if (rc) {
-             ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02257)
-                           "could not buffer message body to allow "
-                           "SSL renegotiation to proceed");
--            return rv;
-+            return rc;
-         }
-     }
- 
-@@ -1132,7 +1144,18 @@
-             }
-         }
- 
-+        /* Fill reneg buffer if required. */
-         if (change_vmode) {
-+            rc = fill_reneg_buffer(r, dc);
-+            if (rc) {
-+                ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO()
-+                              "could not buffer message body to allow "
-+                              "TLS Post-Handshake Authentication to proceed");
-+                return rc;
-+            }
-+        }
-+
-+        if (change_vmode) {
-             char peekbuf[1];
- 
-             if (r->connection->master) {
diff --git a/httpd.spec b/httpd.spec
index 7ad5c6c..51ea1da 100644
--- a/httpd.spec
+++ b/httpd.spec
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ Patch42: httpd-2.4.41-r1828172+.patch
 Patch58: httpd-2.4.34-r1738878.patch
 Patch60: httpd-2.4.34-enable-sslv3.patch
 Patch61: httpd-2.4.41-r1865749.patch
-Patch62: httpd-2.4.41-r1870095.patch
+Patch62: httpd-2.4.41-r1870095+.patch
 
 # Security fixes