From aaf65feac67c3993935634eefe5bc76b9fce03aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001

From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>

Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 11:59:45 +0200

Subject: [PATCH 04/14] EAP-pwd: Use constant time and memory access for

 finding the PWE

This algorithm could leak information to external observers in form of

timing differences or memory access patterns (cache use). While the

previous implementation had protection against the most visible timing

differences (looping 40 rounds and masking the legendre operation), it

did not protect against memory access patterns between the two possible

code paths in the masking operations. That might be sufficient to allow

an unprivileged process running on the same device to be able to

determine which path is being executed through a cache attack and based

on that, determine information about the used password.

Convert the PWE finding loop to use constant time functions and

identical memory access path without different branches for the QR/QNR

cases to minimize possible side-channel information similarly to the

changes done for SAE authentication. (CVE-2019-9495)

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>

---

 src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c | 187 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------------

 1 file changed, 99 insertions(+), 88 deletions(-)

diff --git a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c

index 02fe01e..e49aaf8 100644

--- a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c

+++ b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c

@@ -8,11 +8,15 @@

 #include "includes.h"

 #include "common.h"

+#include "utils/const_time.h"

 #include "crypto/sha256.h"

 #include "crypto/crypto.h"

 #include "eap_defs.h"

 #include "eap_pwd_common.h"

+#define MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN 66

+

+

 /* The random function H(x) = HMAC-SHA256(0^32, x) */

 struct crypto_hash * eap_pwd_h_init(void)

 {

@@ -102,6 +106,15 @@ EAP_PWD_group * get_eap_pwd_group(u16 num)

 }

+static void buf_shift_right(u8 *buf, size_t len, size_t bits)

+{

+	size_t i;

+	for (i = len - 1; i > 0; i--)

+		buf[i] = (buf[i - 1] << (8 - bits)) | (buf[i] >> bits);

+	buf[0] >>= bits;

+}

+

+

 /*

  * compute a "random" secret point on an elliptic curve based

  * on the password and identities.

@@ -113,17 +126,27 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,

 			     const u8 *token)

 {

 	struct crypto_bignum *qr = NULL, *qnr = NULL, *one = NULL;

+	struct crypto_bignum *qr_or_qnr = NULL;

+	u8 qr_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];

+	u8 qnr_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];

+	u8 qr_or_qnr_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];

+	u8 x_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];

 	struct crypto_bignum *tmp1 = NULL, *tmp2 = NULL, *pm1 = NULL;

 	struct crypto_hash *hash;

 	unsigned char pwe_digest[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *prfbuf = NULL, ctr;

-	int is_odd, ret = 0, check, found = 0;

-	size_t primebytelen, primebitlen;

-	struct crypto_bignum *x_candidate = NULL, *rnd = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;

+	int ret = 0, check, res;

+	u8 found = 0; /* 0 (false) or 0xff (true) to be used as const_time_*

+		       * mask */

+	size_t primebytelen = 0, primebitlen;

+	struct crypto_bignum *x_candidate = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;

 	const struct crypto_bignum *prime;

+	u8 mask, found_ctr = 0, is_odd = 0;

 	if (grp->pwe)

 		return -1;

+	os_memset(x_bin, 0, sizeof(x_bin));

+

 	prime = crypto_ec_get_prime(grp->group);

 	cofactor = crypto_bignum_init();

 	grp->pwe = crypto_ec_point_init(grp->group);

@@ -152,8 +175,6 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,

 	/* get a random quadratic residue and nonresidue */

 	while (!qr || !qnr) {

-		int res;

-

 		if (crypto_bignum_rand(tmp1, prime) < 0)

 			goto fail;

 		res = crypto_bignum_legendre(tmp1, prime);

@@ -167,6 +188,11 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,

 		if (!tmp1)

 			goto fail;

 	}

+	if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(qr, qr_bin, sizeof(qr_bin),

+				 primebytelen) < 0 ||

+	    crypto_bignum_to_bin(qnr, qnr_bin, sizeof(qnr_bin),

+				 primebytelen) < 0)

+		goto fail;

 	os_memset(prfbuf, 0, primebytelen);

 	ctr = 0;

@@ -194,17 +220,16 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,

 		eap_pwd_h_update(hash, &ctr, sizeof(ctr));

 		eap_pwd_h_final(hash, pwe_digest);

-		crypto_bignum_deinit(rnd, 1);

-		rnd = crypto_bignum_init_set(pwe_digest, SHA256_MAC_LEN);

-		if (!rnd) {

-			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to create rnd");

-			goto fail;

-		}

+		is_odd = const_time_select_u8(

+			found, is_odd, pwe_digest[SHA256_MAC_LEN - 1] & 0x01);

 		if (eap_pwd_kdf(pwe_digest, SHA256_MAC_LEN,

 				(u8 *) "EAP-pwd Hunting And Pecking",

 				os_strlen("EAP-pwd Hunting And Pecking"),

 				prfbuf, primebitlen) < 0)

 			goto fail;

+		if (primebitlen % 8)

+			buf_shift_right(prfbuf, primebytelen,

+					8 - primebitlen % 8);

 		crypto_bignum_deinit(x_candidate, 1);

 		x_candidate = crypto_bignum_init_set(prfbuf, primebytelen);

@@ -214,24 +239,13 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,

 			goto fail;

 		}

-		/*

-		 * eap_pwd_kdf() returns a string of bits 0..primebitlen but

-		 * BN_bin2bn will treat that string of bits as a big endian

-		 * number. If the primebitlen is not an even multiple of 8

-		 * then excessive bits-- those _after_ primebitlen-- so now

-		 * we have to shift right the amount we masked off.

-		 */

-		if ((primebitlen % 8) &&

-		    crypto_bignum_rshift(x_candidate,

-					 (8 - (primebitlen % 8)),

-					 x_candidate) < 0)

-			goto fail;

-

 		if (crypto_bignum_cmp(x_candidate, prime) >= 0)

 			continue;

-		wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: x_candidate",

-			    prfbuf, primebytelen);

+		wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: x_candidate",

+				prfbuf, primebytelen);

+		const_time_select_bin(found, x_bin, prfbuf, primebytelen,

+				      x_bin);

 		/*

 		 * compute y^2 using the equation of the curve

@@ -261,13 +275,15 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,

 		 * Flip a coin, multiply by the random quadratic residue or the

 		 * random quadratic nonresidue and record heads or tails.

 		 */

-		if (crypto_bignum_is_odd(tmp1)) {

-			crypto_bignum_mulmod(tmp2, qr, prime, tmp2);

-			check = 1;

-		} else {

-			crypto_bignum_mulmod(tmp2, qnr, prime, tmp2);

-			check = -1;

-		}

+		mask = const_time_eq_u8(crypto_bignum_is_odd(tmp1), 1);

+		check = const_time_select_s8(mask, 1, -1);

+		const_time_select_bin(mask, qr_bin, qnr_bin, primebytelen,

+				      qr_or_qnr_bin);

+		crypto_bignum_deinit(qr_or_qnr, 1);

+		qr_or_qnr = crypto_bignum_init_set(qr_or_qnr_bin, primebytelen);

+		if (!qr_or_qnr ||

+		    crypto_bignum_mulmod(tmp2, qr_or_qnr, prime, tmp2) < 0)

+			goto fail;

 		/*

 		 * Now it's safe to do legendre, if check is 1 then it's

@@ -275,59 +291,12 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,

 		 * change result), if check is -1 then it's the opposite test

 		 * (multiplying a qr by qnr would make a qnr).

 		 */

-		if (crypto_bignum_legendre(tmp2, prime) == check) {

-			if (found == 1)

-				continue;

-

-			/* need to unambiguously identify the solution */

-			is_odd = crypto_bignum_is_odd(rnd);

-

-			/*

-			 * We know x_candidate is a quadratic residue so set

-			 * it here.

-			 */

-			if (crypto_ec_point_solve_y_coord(grp->group, grp->pwe,

-							  x_candidate,

-							  is_odd) != 0) {

-				wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,

-					   "EAP-pwd: Could not solve for y");

-				continue;

-			}

-

-			/*

-			 * If there's a solution to the equation then the point

-			 * must be on the curve so why check again explicitly?

-			 * OpenSSL code says this is required by X9.62. We're

-			 * not X9.62 but it can't hurt just to be sure.

-			 */

-			if (!crypto_ec_point_is_on_curve(grp->group,

-							 grp->pwe)) {

-				wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,

-					   "EAP-pwd: point is not on curve");

-				continue;

-			}

-

-			if (!crypto_bignum_is_one(cofactor)) {

-				/* make sure the point is not in a small

-				 * sub-group */

-				if (crypto_ec_point_mul(grp->group, grp->pwe,

-							cofactor,

-							grp->pwe) != 0) {

-					wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,

-						   "EAP-pwd: cannot multiply generator by order");

-					continue;

-				}

-				if (crypto_ec_point_is_at_infinity(grp->group,

-								   grp->pwe)) {

-					wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,

-						   "EAP-pwd: point is at infinity");

-					continue;

-				}

-			}

-			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,

-				   "EAP-pwd: found a PWE in %d tries", ctr);

-			found = 1;

-		}

+		res = crypto_bignum_legendre(tmp2, prime);

+		if (res == -2)

+			goto fail;

+		mask = const_time_eq(res, check);

+		found_ctr = const_time_select_u8(found, found_ctr, ctr);

+		found |= mask;

 	}

 	if (found == 0) {

 		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,

@@ -335,6 +304,44 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,

 			   num);

 		goto fail;

 	}

+

+	/*

+	 * We know x_candidate is a quadratic residue so set it here.

+	 */

+	crypto_bignum_deinit(x_candidate, 1);

+	x_candidate = crypto_bignum_init_set(x_bin, primebytelen);

+	if (!x_candidate ||

+	    crypto_ec_point_solve_y_coord(grp->group, grp->pwe, x_candidate,

+					  is_odd) != 0) {

+		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Could not solve for y");

+		goto fail;

+	}

+

+	/*

+	 * If there's a solution to the equation then the point must be on the

+	 * curve so why check again explicitly? OpenSSL code says this is

+	 * required by X9.62. We're not X9.62 but it can't hurt just to be sure.

+	 */

+	if (!crypto_ec_point_is_on_curve(grp->group, grp->pwe)) {

+		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: point is not on curve");

+		goto fail;

+	}

+

+	if (!crypto_bignum_is_one(cofactor)) {

+		/* make sure the point is not in a small sub-group */

+		if (crypto_ec_point_mul(grp->group, grp->pwe, cofactor,

+					grp->pwe) != 0) {

+			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,

+				   "EAP-pwd: cannot multiply generator by order");

+			goto fail;

+		}

+		if (crypto_ec_point_is_at_infinity(grp->group, grp->pwe)) {

+			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: point is at infinity");

+			goto fail;

+		}

+	}

+	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: found a PWE in %02d tries", found_ctr);

+

 	if (0) {

  fail:

 		crypto_ec_point_deinit(grp->pwe, 1);

@@ -344,14 +351,18 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,

 	/* cleanliness and order.... */

 	crypto_bignum_deinit(cofactor, 1);

 	crypto_bignum_deinit(x_candidate, 1);

-	crypto_bignum_deinit(rnd, 1);

 	crypto_bignum_deinit(pm1, 0);

 	crypto_bignum_deinit(tmp1, 1);

 	crypto_bignum_deinit(tmp2, 1);

 	crypto_bignum_deinit(qr, 1);

 	crypto_bignum_deinit(qnr, 1);

+	crypto_bignum_deinit(qr_or_qnr, 1);

 	crypto_bignum_deinit(one, 0);

-	os_free(prfbuf);

+	bin_clear_free(prfbuf, primebytelen);

+	os_memset(qr_bin, 0, sizeof(qr_bin));

+	os_memset(qnr_bin, 0, sizeof(qnr_bin));

+	os_memset(qr_or_qnr_bin, 0, sizeof(qr_or_qnr_bin));

+	os_memset(pwe_digest, 0, sizeof(pwe_digest));

 	return ret;

 }

-- 

2.7.4